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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a person fails to protect a child in her custody from 
sexual abuse, should she be civilly liable to that child?  She did not 
cause the harm.  She did not increase the harm.  She did not 
prevent others from discovering the harm.  She simply did nothing. 
That was the problem the Minnesota Supreme Court faced in 
Bjerke v. Johnson.1  Suzette Johnson took fourteen-year-old Aja 
Bjerke into her home.2  Bjerke entered into a sexual relationship 
with Johnson’s live-in boyfriend.3  Johnson did not protect Bjerke 
from the harm caused by that relationship.4  A negligence claim 
ensued, and the court had to decide whether a special relationship 
existed between Johnson and Bjerke giving rise to a duty to 
protect.5  The Minnesota Supreme Court held that such a duty 
existed, affirming the appellate court’s decision, though on a 
different legal theory.6
This case note first outlines the history of duty in negligence 
and, particularly, the history of liability for nonfeasance where the 




 1. 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007). 
 2. Id. at 663. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 666 (holding a special relationship existed under the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)).  The court of appeals had rejected use of 
section 314A and found a special relationship under section 324A. Bjerke v. 
Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 742 
N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007). 
 7. See infra Part II.A–C. 
  It outlines how special 
relationships became one of the few avenues to liability for 
nonfeasance and discusses the special relationships laid out in the 
2
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Restatement (Second) of Torts.8  The note then discusses the history of 
special relationships in Minnesota law.9  Next, the note describes 
the facts and the supreme court’s analysis of the Bjerke v. Johnson 
case, focusing on how the court applied the Restatement (Second) 
section 314A(4) to establish a special relationship.10  The note then 
argues that the Bjerke decision represents a significant expansion of 
nonfeasance liability in Minnesota compared with the majority of 
other states.11 The note also argues, however, that the decision is 
solidly grounded in the supreme court’s prior holdings on special 
relationships in Minnesota.12  The note then identifies outstanding 
questions with regard to the relationship between the custodian of 
the child and the child’s parents, the resolution of which will either 
expand or contract the reach of the Bjerke decision in future cases.13  
Finally, the note concludes that the decision is consistent with the 
nonfeasance liability trends identified and predicted by 
commentators and reflected in the latest draft of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts.14
II. HISTORY: NEGLIGENCE, DUTY, AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
A. Origins of Negligence 
Negligence as a distinct tort developed relatively recently.  It 
began to appear around the start of the nineteenth century15 as an 
action against a person who engaged in a “public” or “common” 
calling.16
 
 8. See infra Part II.D. 
 9. See infra Part II.E. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
 12. See infra Part IV.C. 
 13. See infra Part IV.D. 
 14. See infra Part IV.E. 
 15. FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 152 (1933); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 28, at 160 (5th ed. 1984).  
The rise of negligence has been attributed to the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution.  Id. at 161 n.9.  “Perhaps one of the chief agencies in the growth of the 
idea is industrial machinery.  Early railway trains, in particular, were notable 
neither for speed nor for safety.  They killed any object from a Minister of State to 
a wandering cow, and this naturally reacted on the law.”  Id. (quoting Winfield, 
The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REV. 184, 195 (1926)). 
  Innkeepers, surgeons, barbers, smiths, and ferrymen were 
the defendants in what are recognized as the earliest negligence 
 16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 28, at 161. 
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cases.17  The theory was that people in these trades held themselves 
out to the public to be competent and thus assumed an obligation 
to do their work properly.18  Essentially, negligence required that 
the defendant had “formally undertaken to do something which 
the common law required him to do reasonably well.”19
The essence of liability for those in common callings arose 
from the “beneficial nature of the relationship” they had with those 
who required and paid for their services.
 
20  There existed an 
entrustment, a burden in exchange for a benefit,21
As the law evolved, the number of relationships which 
demanded some level of care expanded.  The law began to require 
not only that a person perform an affirmative undertaking 
properly, but under some circumstances, that a person act to avoid 
danger or prevent harm to another without a clear undertaking.
 and therefore a 
certain level of care was required. 
22
Yet throughout this expansion, the concept of a voluntary 
undertaking remained present.  As negligence common law 
progressed, questions of negligence began to fall into one of two 
categories: misfeasance (malfeasance) or nonfeasance.
 
23  
Misfeasance exists when a person undertakes an activity and fails to 
proceed so as to avoid harm to another.24
 
 17. HARPER, supra note 
  Nonfeasance occurs 
when a person fails to protect another or prevent harm to another 
15, § 66, at 153. 
 18. Id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 28 at 161. 
 19. HARPER, supra note 15, § 66, at 153.  Justice Cardozo famously stated that 
“[I]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, 
may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.”  
Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922). 
 20. HARPER, supra note 15, § 66, at 153. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 153-54.  For example: “[I]f one erected a building upon his land, he 
was at once in a more or less definite relationship with others, tenants, guests, 
persons on and owners of adjoining lands, a relationship that became the basis of 
definite obligations to avoid harm to others from his property.”  Id. at 154. 
 23. These terms are also referred to as “commission” and “omission” or 
“action” and “inaction.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 373. 
 24. Id. at 374.  Misfeasance is “misconduct working positive injury to others,” 
where the defendant has somehow created the risk to the plaintiff.  Id. at 373.  
Therefore: “[I]f a force is within the actor’s control, his failure to control it is 
treated as though he were actively directing it and not as a breach of duty to take 
affirmative steps to prevent its continuance . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314 cmt. d (1965).  For example, failure to blow a train whistle when 
necessary would be misfeasance though no action was taken; it would be 
considered negligent operation of a train.  See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, 
at 374. 
4
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through inaction.25  Misfeasance, clearly involving a voluntary 
undertaking, understandably gave rise to liability much more often 
than nonfeasance.26  When a person enters into a relationship with 
another, however, the creation of that relationship itself is a 
voluntary undertaking, and this undertaking was deemed, in some 
situations, to give rise to liability for nonfeasance.27
B. Origin of Duty Element in Negligence 
  Thus, 
misfeasance and sometimes nonfeasance constitute grounds for the 
modern negligence action. 
A negligence claim contains four elements: duty, breach of 
duty, proximate cause, and actual loss or damage.28  Duty is the first 
element of negligence.  If there is no duty, there is no need to 
inquire further into the other elements.29  Thus, duty acts as 
gatekeeper, limiting or expanding the scope of negligence claims.30
In early tort law, “[t]he defendant’s obligation to behave 
properly apparently was owed to all the world, and he was liable to any 
person whom he might injure by his misconduct.”
 
31  The 
negligence claim, however, developed with more limitations than 
the intentional tort did.32
 
 25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 
  It is famously stated that “[n]egligence in 
15, § 56, at 373.  Justice Cardozo distinguished 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance explaining, “The query always is whether 
the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as to have launched a force 
or instrument of harm, or has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to 
become an instrument for good.”  H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 
N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928). 
 26. “The courts were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of 
misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing, even 
though another might suffer harm because of his omission to act.”  KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 15, § 56, at 373. 
 27. Describing nonfeasance, Harper noted, “[I]f he is in some relationship 
with others by reason of some anterior voluntary act, he must, if the relationship is 
of a certain kind, take active precautions to avoid harm to others.”  HARPER, supra 
note 15, § 66, at 154. 
 28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 30, at 164-65. 
 29. HARPER, supra note 15, § 68, at 157.  Whether a special relationship 
creates a duty is a threshold question in Minnesota.  See Errico v. Southland Corp., 
509 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 30. See 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, 
JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 18.1, at 750 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2007) (1956). 
 31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 53, at 357 (emphasis added). 
 32. “The period during which [duty] developed was that of the [I]ndustrial 
[R]evolution, and there is good reason to believe that it was a means by which the 
courts sought, perhaps more or less unconsciously, to limit the responsibilities of 
growing industry within some reasonable bounds.”  Id. 
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the air, so to speak, will not do.”33  Negligence developed in the 
context of relationships and voluntary undertakings giving rise to 
liability,34
Generally, duty can be defined as “an obligation, to which the 
law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular 
standard of conduct toward another.”
 and those ideas permeate the duty requirement. 
35  Yet, many variations exist.  
Somewhat cynical descriptions include: “There is a duty if the court 
says there is a duty . . . .  [D]uty is only a word with which we state 
our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability . . . .”36  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts initially avoids the word duty and 
describes the element this way: liability exists for “an invasion of an 
interest of another, if: (a) the interest invaded is protected against 
unintentional invasion . . . .”37  Prosser and Keeton warn “that ‘duty’ 
is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total 
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
plaintiff is entitled to protection.”38  They also conclude that “no 
better general statement can be made than that the courts will find 
a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it 
and agree that it exists.”39
 
 33. Id. (quoting P.A. LANDON, POLLOCK’S LAW OF TORTS 468 (13th ed. 1920)). 
 34. See supra discussion in Part II.A. 
 
 35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 53, at 356.  Duty proved difficult to define 
from the beginning.  The first attempt in 1883 was cumbersome and broad: 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position 
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think 
would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in 
his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause 
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to 
use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. 
Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (Eng.). 
 36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting William L. Prosser, 
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953)). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).  However, the word “duty” 
is introduced later in the Restatement.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS            
§ 328A (1965).  Commentators note that Prosser intended section 281 to be “only 
a semantic, not a substantive variation” of the standard formula and that he 
introduced section 328A “precisely for the purpose of harmonizing Section 281’s 
formulation with the traditional four-part test.”  John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 657, 673–74 (2001).  In response, other scholars suggest that the duty 
element is assumed; the “existence of a duty [is] the default position where a 
defendant's ‘affirmative act’ or ‘conduct’ creates a risk of harm.”  W. Jonathan 
Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 695 (2008). 
 38. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 53, at 358. 
 39. Id. at 359. 
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C. No Duty to Protect 
Despite an early emergence of liability for some types of 
nonfeasance,40 the law has long attempted to circumscribe it by 
making liability the exception to the rule.41  As stated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[t]he fact that the actor realizes or 
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid 
or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action.”42  This “no-duty-to-protect” rule applies regardless of the 
severity of the danger or the ease of the action43 and has led to 
seemingly harsh results.44
D. Exceptions: Special Relationships 
 
As one would expect, exceptions to the no-duty-to-protect rule 
have developed over time.  One exception arises where a 
relationship between two people is deemed “special.”45  Just as duty 
in the broader sense reflects public policy, the decision that certain 
relationships should give rise to liability for nonfeasance reflects 
“custom, public sentiment, and views of social policy.”46
 
 40. See supra note 
  And 
similar to the public callings that constituted the first undertakings 
22 and accompanying text. 
 41. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 373 (citing LEON GREEN, JUDGE 
AND JURY, 62 (1930)) (“[T]he highly individualistic philosophy of the older 
common law . . . shrank from converting the courts into an agency for forcing 
men to help one another.”). 
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. cmt. c. 
 44. See id. (“The result of the rule has been a series of older decisions to the 
effect that one human being, seeing a fellow man in dire peril, is under no legal 
obligation to aid him, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigar, and watch the 
other drown.”); see also Andrew D. Kaplan, “Cash-ing Out:” Regulating Omissions, 
Analysis of the Sherrice Iverson Act, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 67, 
78 (2000) (describing the public outcry and subsequent legislation after a seven-
year-old girl was raped and murdered in a casino restroom while a friend of the 
perpetrator merely looked on, did not report, and was not civilly or criminally 
liable); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 423, 423 (1985) (describing the famous 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese, 
who was stabbed repeatedly in the street while thirty-eight neighbors looked on, 
and proposing civil and criminal liability for failure to aid).  Minnesota, however, 
does have a “Good Samaritan Law.”  See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subdiv. 1 (2006) 
(making a person’s failure to provide reasonable aid at the scene of an emergency 
a petty misdemeanor if the person faces no risk in doing so). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).  In Minnesota, a duty to 
protect requires both a special relationship and foreseeability.  See Erickson v. 
Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168–69 (Minn. 1989). 
 46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 374. 
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giving rise to negligence liability,47 today’s special relationships also 
reflect such an entrustment.48
Relationships that give rise to a duty to protect fall into two 
major categories outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
 
49 and a 
third type that Minnesota law describes as a special relationship 
and so described here.50
First, some relationships are “protective by nature.”
 
51  This type 
of special relationship arises generally from section 315(b) and 
specifically from sections 320 and 314A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.52  Under section 315(b), there is a duty to control the 
conduct of a third party where a special relationship “exists 
between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to 
protection.”53  Section 320 expands upon this rule.54  Section 314A 
provides a more general duty to “aid or protect” in several 
situations: a common carrier has a duty toward its passengers, an 
innkeeper toward guests, and a possessor of land toward invitees.55  
Lastly and most significant to the Bjerke case, section 314A(4) says 
that “one who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes 
the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the 
other of his normal opportunities for protection56
 
 47. See supra Part II.A. 
 has a . . . duty to the 
 48. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 374 (explaining that nonfeasance 
liability exists when there is “some definite relation between the parties, of such a 
character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act”). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 315(b), 320 (1965). 
 50. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.  Other grounds for nonfeasance 
liability exist but are outside the scope of this case note.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965) (stating that if the actor’s prior conduct creates a 
situation of peril, the actor has a duty to protect another from the danger). 
 51. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 383 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 320 (1965)). 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 315(b), 320 (1965). 
 53. Id. § 315(b). 
 54. Section 320 provides: “[O]ne who is required by law to take or who 
voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive 
the other of his normal power of self-protection . . . is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons . . . if the actor (a) 
knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the 
third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for 
exercising such control.”  Id. § 320. 
 55. Id. § 314A.  Additionally, the Restatement (Second) notes that an employer 
has a similar duty to an employee.  Id. cmt. a. 
 56. Section 314A reads “normal opportunities for protection,” while the 
related section 320 refers to the “normal power of self-protection.” See id. §§ 314A, 
320.  While this difference in wording is slight, the word “self” adds a limitation 
which is significant in Bjerke v. Johnson, where normal opportunities for protection 
8
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other.”57
The second category contains special relationships which are 
“custodial in nature,” that is, where a custodian must protect others 
from a dangerous person in his or her care.
 
58  Section 315(a) 
provides that a special relationship may exist between the actor 
(the person charged with liability for nonfeasance) and a third 
party (person causing the injury) such that the relationship 
“imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s 
conduct.”59  Thus, the injured party has a claim against the actor 
(essentially a non-actor) for failure to protect him or her from the 
third party.60
The third category, referred to as a special relationship in 
Minnesota,
  This type of special relationship was not applicable in 
Bjerke v. Johnson and therefore will not be discussed further in this 
note. 
61
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other 
 comes from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A: 
[O]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to render services to another which he should recognize 
as necessary for the protection of a third person or his 
things, is subject to liability to the third person for 
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the 
risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the 
other to the third person, or 
 
were at issue.  The dissent stated, “For purposes of section 314A, . . . we are only 
concerned with the availability of normal opportunities of self-protection, not 
whether a child’s circumstances are conducive to being protected by another.”  
Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 676 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (Anderson, G. Barry, J., 
dissenting). 
 57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (emphasis added). 
 58. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 383.  For example, a parent must 
protect others from a dangerous child, and an employer must protect others from 
an employee. Id. at 384. Sometimes the two categories overlap.  A prison, having 
two prisoners in its charge, would be required to protect the first from the second, 
and control the second to protect the first.  See id. at 383–84. 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a) (1965). 
 60. Specifically, a parent has a duty to control a child, a master must control a 
servant, a possessor of land must control a licensee, and one who takes charge of a 
person with dangerous propensities must control that person. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316–319 (1965). 
 61. E.g., Bjerke v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
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or the third person upon the undertaking.62
This special relationship allows for the transference of liability 
to someone who assumes a duty for another.  In Bjerke v. Johnson, 
the court of appeals applied this theory, but the supreme court’s 
majority opinion did not.
 
63
Having laid out the three special relationship categories, the 
Restatement notes that the list is not exclusive and that the law seems 
to be “working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or 
protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”
  Therefore, this note includes limited 
discussion of the section 324A special relationship. 
64  
Additionally, it is important to note that even where a special 
relationship arises, the duty created is only to act with reasonable 
care.65
E. Special Relationships in Minnesota 
Minnesota generally follows the Restatement in the area of 
liability for nonfeasance.  The circumstances of the relationship 
determine whether a duty exists, and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has found relatively few special relationships. 
 
1. Hospital and Patient Relationships 
Some of the earliest cases in Minnesota recognizing a duty to 
protect arose where patients were injured in hospitals.66  In Sylvester 
v. Northwestern Hospital of Minneapolis,67 decided in 1952, an 
intoxicated patient wandered into the plaintiff’s hospital room and 
hit him in the abdomen near his healing appendectomy incision.68
 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
 63. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007). 
 64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. cmt. e. 
 66. See, e.g., Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n of Duluth, 194 Minn. 198, 259 
N.W. 819 (1935) (recognizing duty of reasonable care by hospital to patient where 
patient jumped from second-story window but finding insufficient evidence on 
issue of foreseeability); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minn. 
Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of N. Am., 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920) 
(recognizing duty of reasonable care by hospital to pneumonia patient who fell 
from second-story window). 
 67. 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17 (1952). 
 68. Id. at 385–86, 53 N.W.2d at 18. 
  
The court held the hospital liable, relying on the Restatement (First) 
of Torts section 320, which imposes a duty to exercise reasonable 
care on one who “‘voluntarily takes custody . . . such as to deprive 
10
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the other of his normal power of self-protection’” provided that the 
actor knows or should know of his ability to control the third party 
and of the need to do so.69  While the court noted that a private 
hospital doesn’t ensure its patients’ safety, it added that the duty of 
reasonable care “must always be in proportion to the patient’s 
inability to look after his own safety.”70
2. Voluntary Undertaking or Assumption of Duty 
  Thus, the court emphasized 
that the duty to protect hinged on the patient’s lack of ability to 
protect himself, provided the hospital could control the third party. 
1979 brought three important special-relationship decisions by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.  First, the court decided Cracraft v. 
City of St. Louis Park.71  The plaintiff alleged that the city was liable 
for the negligent inspection of a building under its own fire code.72  
The court applied the common law special-relationship doctrine, 
citing Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315, to the municipality73 
to determine whether it owed more than a mere “general” duty to 
the public.74  A “special duty,” as the court described it, reflects “the 
ancient doctrine that once a duty to act for the protection of others 
is voluntarily assumed, due care must be exercised even though 
there was no duty to act in the first instance.”75  The court found 
that the purpose of the inspections was to protect “the interests of 
the municipality as a whole” and not to protect individuals.76  Thus, 
the city did not voluntarily undertake the protection of individuals 
and therefore could not be liable under the special-relationship 
exception to the “no-duty-to-protect” rule.77
 
 69. Id. at 387, 53 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 320 
(1934)). 
 70. Id. at 386, 53 N.W.2d at 19. 
 71. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979). 
 72. Municipalities generally owe a duty to the public, but not to individuals. 
Id. at 804.  The purpose of building codes is to protect the public, but the codes 
do not act as insurance by the government as to the buildings’ safety.  Id. at 804 
(quoting Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 223, 199 
N.W.2d 158, 160 (1972)). 
 73. The sovereign-immunity defense had previously been abolished by the 
legislature. Id. at 803. 
 74. Id. at 804–05. 
 75. Id. at 806. 
 76. Id. at 805. 
 
 77. The court, though finding no special relationship, laid out four factors it 
would consider: actual knowledge of a danger, reasonable reliance on the city’s 
conduct, a statute that “sets forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a 
particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole,” and whether the city 
11
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Again in 1979, the court analyzed the duty of care in Walsh v. 
Pagra Air Taxi, Inc.78  Here, the defendant was a “fixed base 
operator” employed by a municipal airport to provide various 
airport services, including fire protection.79  A plane caught fire, 
and employees attempted to put the fire out but could not access 
their firefighting equipment because the building door housing 
the equipment was damaged.80  As a result, the plane was heavily 
damaged.81  The court stated that while the municipality had no 
general duty to prevent harm to private property, it had voluntarily 
undertaken the task by providing fire-protection equipment and 
personnel.82  Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A, 
the court then held that the defendant, the “fixed base operator,” 
had a duty of care because it had undertaken to perform the city’s 
duty.83
3. Special Relationships under the Restatement 
  This holding again emphasizes that a voluntary undertaking 
can result in liability where none previously existed. 
Just a few months later, the court had another opportunity to 
address special relationships in Delgado v. Lohmar.84  Here, a group 
of grouse hunters entered private property without the landowner’s 
consent.  When the landowner approached the hunters to request 
that they leave his property, one of the hunters in the group 
accidentally shot and blinded the landowner.85  The landowner 
claimed that once the hunters saw him they had a duty to protect, 
that is, to inform the others in their group of his presence.86  The 
court stated the rule that there is generally no duty to protect, but 
the exception is where a special relationship exists.87
 
increased the risk of harm.  Id. at 806–07. 
 78. 282 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1979). 
 79. Id. at 569. 
 80. Id. at 570. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 570–71 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965)). 
 84. 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979). 
 85. Id. at 481–82. 
 86. Id. at 483. 
 87. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965)). 
  Specifically, it 
stated that special relationships exist between “parents and 
children, masters and servants, possessors of land and licensees, 
common carriers and their customers, or people who have custody 
12
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of a person with dangerous propensities.”88  Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the parties were strangers and no special 
relationship existed between them,89 but the Delgado case is cited 
for having recognized and laid out the different types of special 
relationships recognized in Minnesota.90
4. No Duty to Protect from Criminal Activity 
 
In 1985, the court held in Pietila v. Congdon that a homeowner 
does not have a duty to protect invitees from the criminal acts of 
third persons.91  The court stated that “[a] criminal act such as 
murder or armed robbery committed by a person or persons 
unknown is not an activity of the owner and does not constitute a 
condition of the land.”92
 
 88. Id. at 484 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).  
However, the Delgado case caused some confusion on the issue of special 
relationships between parents and children. The decision did not distinguish 
between types of special relationships—whether the parents have a duty to protect 
their children or whether they have a duty to protect others from their children.  
The facts of the Delgado case indicate that it only intended to recognize the latter 
type, see id., which comes from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 316.  The case 
has subsequently been cited, however, as holding that a parent has a duty to 
protect his or her child, which is not a Restatement special relationship.  See 
Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a 
Christian Scientist mother whose son died of diabetes because the mother did not 
believe in obtaining conventional medicine was in a special relationship with son).  
However, subsequent cases indicate a growing recognition of a duty of parent to 
child. See Foss v. Kincade, 746 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), review 
granted, (recognizing that parents have a “paramount duty” to protect their 
children, though not in special relationship context), Sunnarborg v. Howard, 581 
N.W.2d 397, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that third party does not stand in 
special relationship to child when parent is present because parent has 
responsibility to protect). 
 89. The court still held the hunters liable, however, because of the danger of 
using firearms while trespassing.  Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Minn. 
1979). 
 90. The supreme court cited it in Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 
2007), Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001), and Johnson v. State, 553 
N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1996). 
 91. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1985) (holding that trustees 
of home did not have special relationship with nurse who was killed in the home 
by an unknown intruder). 
 92. Id. at 333. 
  Therefore, no special relationship existed 
creating a duty for a homeowner to protect guests against criminal 
acts by third parties. 
13
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5. Entrustment, Policy and Unique Circumstances 
In 1989, certain facts finally persuaded the court that a special 
relationship existed, thereby creating a duty to protect from third 
persons.  In Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co.,93 a woman was raped in 
a parking ramp monitored by a security firm.94  The court had to 
decide whether the owners/operators of the parking ramp and its 
security firm had a duty to protect her from criminal acts.95  
Recognizing the historic underpinnings of the special relationship, 
the court defined it as “a situation where B has in some way 
entrusted his or her safety to A and A has accepted that 
entrustment.”96  Furthermore, the harm to be prevented must be 
one that the defendant is “in a position to protect against and 
should be expected to protect against.”97  Though acknowledging a 
general reluctance by courts to impose a duty on businesses to 
protect customers from criminal acts, the court said that the 
decision depends on the relationship of the parties and 
foreseeability of the risk involved.98  “Ultimately, the question is one 
of policy.”99  The court decided that the “general characteristics of a 
parking ramp” create a “unique opportunity for criminals”; thus, 
the owner and operator of the ramp owed the plaintiff a duty to 
exercise reasonable care.100
Next, the court explained why the security firm also owed the 
plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care. The security firm that 
patrolled the ramp undertook to perform a duty owed by the 
owner/operator of the ramp to a third party (i.e., the plaintiff).
 
101  
Thus, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A, the 
security firm also had a duty to the plaintiff.102
 
 93. 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989). 
 94. Id. at 166. 
 95. Id. at 168. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 168–69. 
 99. Id. at 169. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 170–71. 
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6. Custody and Normal Opportunities for Self-Protection – Section 
314A(4) 
In Harper v. Herman103 in 1993, the court recognized an 
additional special relationship, found in section 314A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which creates a duty in “persons who 
have custody of another person under circumstances in which that 
other person is deprived of normal opportunities of self-
protection.”104  The court found no such relationship where a 
twenty-year-old man, a social guest on a boat, dove off the side into 
shallow water and sustained serious injuries.105  The boat owner had 
no duty to warn or protect because he did not have custody of his 
guest, nor was the guest deprived of normal opportunities for self-
protection.106  The court noted that deprivation of normal 
opportunities for self-protection means that “the plaintiff is 
typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent 
upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable 
power over the plaintiff’s welfare.”107  Furthermore, “such relations 
have often involved some existing or potential economic advantage 
to the defendant” and therefore, “[f]airness . . . may require the 
defendant to use his power to help the plaintiff, based upon the 
plaintiff’s expectation of protection, which itself may be based 
upon the defendant’s expectation of financial gain.”108
In 1995, in Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of 
Duluth,
 
109 the supreme court reiterated the Harper factors of 
vulnerability, dependency, and considerable power.110  The court 
held that the YWCA did not have a duty to protect a female 
resident who committed suicide on its premises because it had no 
custody or control, there was no entrustment, it did not deprive her 
of opportunities for self-protection, and it was not in a position to 
protect the resident from committing suicide.111
 
 103. 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993). 
 104. Id. at 474 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)).  
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (using the phrase 
“normal opportunities for protection”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  
§ 320 (1965) (using the term “self-protection”). 
 105. Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474. 
 106. Id. 
 
 107. Id. at 474 n.2 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56 at 374). 
 108. Id. (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56 at 374.) 
 109. 539 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 1995). 
 110. Id. at 792 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56 at 374). 
 111. Id. at 793. 
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In 1996, the court decided H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, in 
which several small children reported sexual abuse to their trailer 
park manager, who advised them to tell their parents and took no 
further action.112  The court found that there was no special 
relationship.113  Specifically, it found no acceptance of entrustment 
by the manager and noted that although the children were 
vulnerable, the manager had neither custody nor daily control over 
them.114  The court stated in dicta that, even if the manager did 
have custody or control, she did not deprive the children of 
opportunities for self-protection; in fact, the children 
demonstrated their ability to protect themselves by telling their 
parents about the abuse weeks later.115
In 1999, the court held in Gilbertson v. Leininger that 
homeowners did not have a special relationship under section 
314A with an adult social guest who stayed overnight and fell in 
their home, sustaining serious injuries.
 
116  The question of liability 
arose because the homeowners, believing the guest was still 
intoxicated from the night before, did not obtain emergency care 
until late the next day.117  The court found that the homeowners 
had no custody over their guest, the guest did not lack the 
opportunity for self-protection, and the guest had no reason to 
expect protection from her hosts.118
Most recently, in 2007, the court had yet another opportunity 
to address special relationships in Becker v. Mayo Foundation.
 
119  A 
hospital was sued for failing to recognize and report child abuse of 
an infant.120
 
 112. 552 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Minn. 1996). 
 113. Id. at 708. 
 114. Id. at 708–09.  The court also commented that “[a]n adult who does not 
stand in a caretaking relationship with a child should not have thrust upon her an 
ill-defined legal responsibility to take ‘some reasonable action’—as suggested by 
the dissent—because the child chose to report mistreatment to her.” Id. at 709. 
 115. Id.  The court also noted, “[W]e recognize a feeling of shame and fear 
about telling their parents would be a natural reaction for the children, but we 
decline to graft an exception to the common law rule of no duty simply because 
the personal feelings of the victims might inhibit their taking care of themselves.” 
Id. 
 116. 599 N.W.2d 127, 132 (Minn. 1999). 
 117. Id. at 129–30. 
 118. Id. at 131–32. 
 119. 737 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 2007). 
 120. Id. at 205. 
  The court found that no special relationship existed 
because the hospital did not accept custody of the infant while 
treating her injuries, and it did not “exercise control over . . . [the 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/7
 
730 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
child’s] daily welfare”; the child’s parents held that role.121  The 
court further rejected a special relationship under section 314A 
because though the infant was clearly vulnerable, she was not 
“deprived of ordinary means of protection . . . because she never 
had any such means.”122
III. THE BJERKE DECISION 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has found few instances of 
special relationships, but it has provided a multitude of factors that 
would suggest a special relationship exists.  To briefly review, the 
factors suggesting a section 314A special relationship are primarily 
custody or control over daily welfare and deprivation of power or 
opportunity for self-protection.  Additional supporting factors 
include entrustment and acceptance, dependence, being in a 
position to protect and being expected to protect, particular 
vulnerability, considerable power over the plaintiff’s welfare, 
financial gain, and unique circumstances.  This conglomeration of 
factors reflected the state of the section 314A special relationship in 
Minnesota when the supreme court heard Bjerke v. Johnson. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Suzette Johnson owned and ran a horse farm called Island 
Farm, where she lived with her male friend Kenneth Bohlman.123  
Johnson often invited teenagers to visit her farm to ride and learn 
about horses.124  One of these children was Aja Bjerke, who was 
fourteen years old in 1997 on her first visit to Island Farm.125
Bjerke continued to visit Island Farm for weekends and short 
time periods, and soon she began to increase the length and 
frequency of her stays.
 
126  She spent the entire summers of 1998 and 
1999 at the farm, and by the spring of 2000, she resided full-time 
with Johnson and Bohlman.127
Early in her stay, Bjerke and Bohlman entered into a sexual 




 121. Id. at 213. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. 2007). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 664. 
  The relationship was 
17
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consensual, and Bjerke attempted to hide the relationship from 
Johnson because she “loved Bohlman and did not want him to get 
into trouble.”129  Bjerke left Island Farm in 2001 at age eighteen 
and subsequently informed law enforcement about the sexual 
relationship.130
Bjerke then filed a negligence claim against Johnson for failing 
to protect her from sexual abuse.
 
131  Johnson moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that she had no duty to protect Bjerke 
from harm by a third person because no special relationship 
existed between them.132
The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding 
that Johnson had no duty to protect, and then it certified the issues 
for appeal.
 
133  The court of appeals reversed, finding a special 
relationship giving rise to a duty to protect under Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 324A.134
B. Majority Opinion 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ 
decision, though on different grounds.135  The court agreed that 
Johnson had a special relationship with Bjerke and therefore a duty 
to protect her, but it did not reach a majority decision regarding 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A.136  Instead, the 
supreme court found a special relationship under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 314A, the rule cited in Harper v. Herman: a 
special relationship “arises when an individual, whether voluntarily 
or as required by law, has ‘custody of another person under 
circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal 
opportunities of self-protection.’”137
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  Bohlman was convicted of criminal sexual conduct for his relationship 
with Bjerke. See State v. Bohlman, No. A05-207, 2006 WL 915765, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 11, 2006). 
 131. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 663. 
 132. Id. at 663–64.  Johnson also claimed assumption of the risk as an 
affirmative defense to bar the negligence claim. Id. 
 133. Id.  The district court also held that assumption of the risk did apply to 
minors so as to bar the negligence claim. Id. 
 134. Bjerke v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d on 
other grounds, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007).  The court of appeals also held that 
Bjerke was not capable of assuming the risk prior to age sixteen. Id. at 195. 
 135. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 663. 
 136. Id. at 667. 
 
 137. Id. at 665 (quoting Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 
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The court first analyzed the custody prong of the test and held 
that Johnson had custody of Bjerke as a matter of law as early as the 
summer of 1998 when Bjerke spent her first summer at Island 
Farm.138  Although Johnson never obtained legal custody, the court 
decided that she satisfied a non-legal definition of custody by 
“accept[ing] entrustment of some level of care for Bjerke when 
Bjerke stayed at Johnson’s home, at a location distant from her 
parents’ home.”139  The court pointed out that Johnson provided 
room, board, and rules for Bjerke and thus had a “large degree of 
control over Bjerke’s welfare, strongly indicating that there was a 
special relationship between the two.”140
Having satisfied the custody element, the court analyzed the 
second prong of the test: whether Bjerke was “deprived of normal 
opportunities of self-protection.”
 
141  The court of appeals held that 
Bjerke’s opportunities for self-protection were the same in 
Johnson’s custody as in her parents’ custody; therefore, she was not 
deprived of them.142  The supreme court rejected this idea, stating 
that a child’s “primary source of protection” is her parents.143  
Bjerke, a minor, was living away from her parents under the daily 
care and supervision of Johnson, and the court found that this 
created a “substantial” deprivation of normal opportunities for 
protection.144  Furthermore, the court noted that Bjerke need only 
have lost normal opportunities for protection; it was not necessary 
that she lose all protection.145
The majority also addressed the potential disconnect between 
its decision in H.B. and its decision in Bjerke.  Because the H.B. 
court did not find the requisite custody, its comment that the 
young children were capable of self-protection because they could 
tell their parents about their abuse was “mere dicta.”
 
146  Moreover, 




 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 213 (Minn. 2007)). 
 141. Id. at 666. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 667 n.3. 
 147. Id. at 667. 
  First, she lived away from her parents, her normal source of 
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protection, while she was abused.148  Second, she lived with her 
abuser, where she would be under pressure not to report the 
abuse.149
Persuaded on both custody and lack of opportunity for self-
protection, the majority held that a section 314A special 
relationship existed between Bjerke and Johnson.
  Thus, the court concluded that Bjerke was sufficiently 
distinguishable from H.B. 
150  If Bjerke could 
show that the harm was foreseeable, then Johnson had a duty 
toward Bjerke.151  No holding was issued on whether a special 
relationship under section 324A existed.152
C.   Concurrence 
 
Two justices concluded that a special relationship should exist 
under section 324A in addition to section 314A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.153  They argued that Johnson gratuitously 
undertook to “render services to Bjerke’s parents . . . which [she] 
should have recognized as being necessary for Bjerke’s 
protection,”154 that she undertook a duty owed by Bjerke’s parents 
to Bjerke, and finally that the parents relied on Johnson’s 
undertaking.155
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
foreseeability, which precluded summary judgment. Id. at 668.  The evidence 
showed that Johnson and others had noticed “unusual and intimate behavior” 
between Bohlman and Bjerke over the course of Bjerke’s stay at Island Farm. Id. at 
668–69. 
 152. Id. at 667. 
 153. Id. at 671 (Hanson, J., concurring). 
 154. Id.  The justices rejected Johnson’s argument that the word “undertaking” 
required explicit agreement between Bjerke’s parents and Johnson, relying on the 
common meaning of the term and the court’s decision in Erickson, 447 N.W.2d 
165 (Minn. 1989), where no explicit agreement was found.  Id. at 672.  The 
concurrence also argued that making an adult’s responsibility to a child rest solely 
on the adult’s explicit agreement with the child’s parents would violate public 
policy.  Id. at 674.  It would create a “dead zone” where the “custodian, who was in 
the best position to care for the child, would have no duty to do so, while the 
parents, who were too distant to actually care for the day to day needs of the child, 
would retain the duty to do so.”  Id.  The duties of parents and custodians are not 
“mutually exclusive, but can be shared and overlap.”  Id.  The concurrence 
satisfied the final prong of section 324A by arguing that Johnson both undertook a 
duty owed to Bjerke by her parents, and that the harm was suffered because 
Bjerke’s parents relied on Johnson.  Id. at 675. 
 155. Id. at 674. 
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D. Dissent 
According to the dissent, no special relationship existed under 
sections 314A or 324A, and the Bjerke case represents a “significant 
expansion of third party liability.”156  The dissent did not dispute 
the custody issue, but questioned whether Bjerke was deprived of 
opportunities for self-protection.  The dissent focused on the H.B. 
decision, where small children reported sex abuse to their trailer 
park manager.157  In H.B. the court concluded that the children 
were capable of self-protection because they actually protected 
themselves by telling their parents of the abuse.158  If these small 
children were capable of self-protection, the dissent argued, Bjerke 
certainly was.159  The dissent also rejected the majority’s conclusion 
that because Bjerke was living in the same household as her abuser 
she was less able to protect herself than the children in H.B.160  
Finally, the dissent argued that “for purposes of section 314A, 
however, we are only concerned with the availability of normal 
opportunities of self-protection, not whether the child’s 
circumstances are conducive to being protected by another.”161
The dissent also analyzed section 324A.  It noted that the 
scope of the undertaking limits the scope of the duty.
 
162  Since 
Johnson did not undertake to protect Bjerke from third parties, she 
could not have had a duty to do so.163  The dissent also argued that 
public policy requires that courts exercise restraint in transferring 
parental rights.164  “A parent’s abdication of his or her parental 
duties does not effectuate the transfer of those duties to 
another.”165  The dissenting justices further argued that even if 
protection of Bjerke was within the scope of Johnson’s 
undertaking, the case did not satisfy the other elements of section 
324A.166
 
 156. Id. at 681 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). 
 157. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996). 
 158. Id. at 709. 
 159. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 676 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 676 n.11 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at 677. 
 163. Id. at 678. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. They argued that Johnson’s failure to intervene did not increase the risk 
of harm under 324A(a), that she did not undertake a duty owed to Bjerke by her 
parents under 324A(b), and that the harm to Bjerke was not caused by her 
parents’ reliance on Johnson under 324A(c).  See id. at 678–81. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The Bjerke case involved offensive behavior on the part of two 
adults.  Not only was there sexual abuse of a minor by Bohlman, 
there was evidence suggesting that Johnson accepted Bjerke into 
her home to give her a “more stable environment”167 and then 
closed her eyes when she suspected an inappropriate relationship 
between Bohlman and Bjerke.168
However, our common law tradition does not easily 
accommodate the creation of a duty in one person to protect 
another.
 
169  The Bjerke decision represents a significant expansion of 
nonfeasance liability in Minnesota compared with a majority of 
other states.170  Yet the decision is solidly grounded in the supreme 
court’s prior holdings on special relationships.171  However, there 
are outstanding questions about how the Bjerke decision will be 
applied, especially with regard to the relationship between the 
custodian of the child and the child’s parents.  The answers to 
these questions will determine the extent of the expansion of 
nonfeasance liability in Minnesota.172  The decision is also 
consistent with the trends and predictions for nonfeasance liability 
given by commentators and reflected in the latest draft of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts.173
A. Significant Expansion of Nonfeasance Liability in Minnesota 
 
Over the last few decades, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
rarely found that special relationships gave rise to a duty to protect.  
Instead, it had emphasized the narrowness of the exceptions 
allowed under Minnesota law.  The majority in H.B. rejected the 
dissent’s basis for liability,174
 
 167. Id. at 664 (majority opinion). 
 168. Id. at 668–69. 
 169. See supra Part II.C–E. 
 170. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 171. See infra Part IV.C. 
 172. See infra Part IV.D. 
 173. See infra Part IV.E. 
 stating that it did not “even remotely 
 174. The dissent stated: “[W]hile we may not be our brother’s keeper, in a 
civilized society, I believe it appropriate that the law recognize that we may be our 
children’s keeper.”  H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 
1996) (Gardebring, J., dissenting).  The dissent would have concluded that the 
trailer park manager had a duty under the Erickson decision based on unique 
circumstances: because the abuse was reported to the manager, the children could 
not protect themselves, state policy protected children from sexual abuse, and a 
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fall[] within the parameters this court has carefully carved out as 
the outer boundaries for this exception to the common law rule” 
that there is no general duty to protect.175
Prior to Bjerke, the court had not found any cases persuasive on 
both the custody factor and the lack of opportunity for self-
protection factor under section 314A(4).  As discussed earlier, the 
court repeatedly rejected special relationships where the plaintiff 
was a guest in the home or on the property of the defendants.
 
176  
The court had rejected a special relationship where the protection 
of small children from sexual predators was at issue.177  The court 
had also rejected a homeowner’s duty to protect against unknown 
criminal intruders.178
Until Bjerke, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not recognized 
a special relationship between two private individuals.
 
179  Special 
relationships only existed between certain businesses and 
individuals,180 hospitals and patients,181 innkeepers and guests, and 
common carriers and passengers.182
B. Application of Section 314A(4) Outside of Minnesota 
Few other state supreme courts have recognized a section 
314A(4) special relationship similar to that in Bjerke, making this 
decision a significant expansion of nonfeasance liability on the 
national scene, as well as in Minnesota. 
  The Bjerke decision expanded 
nonfeasance liability into the realm of private citizens, specifically 
to custodians of minor guests using section 314A(4). 
To create a special relationship under section 314A(4), one 
 
statute required a trailer park manager be on duty to respond to emergencies.  Id. 
 175. Id. at 709 (majority opinion). 
 176. See Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999); Harper v. 
Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993). 
 177. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996). 
 178. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1985). 
 179. However, appellate level cases had done so.  See Laska v. Anoka County, 
696 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that daughter of day care 
operator who had accepted entrustment of children had special relationship with 
infant who died of SIDS while at the daycare); Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 
807, 820–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where the child of a Christian 
Scientist mother died for lack of conventional medical treatment, the stepfather 
and the Christian Scientist nurse hired by the mother were in a special 
relationship with the child). 
 180. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989). 
 181. Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17 
(1952). 
 182. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993). 
23
Menzhuber: Torts: In the Absence of Parents: Expanding Liability for Caretak
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] BJERKE V. JOHNSON 737 
must take “the custody of another under circumstances such as to 
deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection.”183
1. Custody or Control 
  
Since custody must exist before the second element is analyzed, 
custody is often examined in more detail than is the second 
element, deprivation of opportunities for protection. 
In Bjerke, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that 
custody can take on an informal and common-language meaning.  
Relying on the Random House Dictionary definition, “keeping; 
guardianship; care,”184 the court found that Johnson took custody 
of Bjerke when she began living at Island Farm full-time for a 
summer.185
One of the most common applications of section 314A(4) is in 
the relationship between a prison and an inmate.  Formal legal 
custody exists in a prison setting, so it is well settled that the prison 
must protect inmates during their confinement, even from 
suicide.
  Though custody has not been consistently defined 
across the United States, the Bjerke definition is significantly 
broader than what most other state high courts have adopted. 
186  Custody has also been expanded to include traffic 
stops.187
 
 183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965) (emphasis added). 
 184. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 665 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (citing RANDOM 
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 494 (2nd ed. 1987).  But cf. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 412 (8th ed. 2004) (defining custody as “care and control of a 
thing or person for inspection, preservation, or security”). 
 185. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 665. 
 186. See Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 466–67 (Alaska 2001) (holding jailors 
have duty to protect against foreseeable harm, including suicide, due to custodial 
relationship with prisoner); Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. 
1998) (holding prison has duty toward prisoner in its custody, though not an 
insurer of the prisoner’s safety); cf. C.J.W. ex rel. L.W. v. State, 853 P.2d 4, 11–12 
(Kan. 1993) (recognizing custodial relationship between county juvenile hall and 
juvenile inmate); Hickey v. Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Mich. 1992) (finding 
custody where decedent was kept in a university holding cell awaiting transfer to 
county jail). 
 187. Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989).  In Kaisner a police officer 
pulled over a driver onto the roadside, and another car hit the police car causing 
injury to the driver.  Id. at 733.  The court defined custody as the “detainer of a 
man's person by virtue of lawful process or authority.”  Id. at 734 (citing BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 347 (5th ed. 1979)).  “The term is very elastic and may mean 
actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physical, of 
imprisoning or of taking manual possession.”  Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
347 (5th ed. 1979)).  The petitioner was not free to leave the area without 
becoming subject to criminal charges, therefore the relationship was custodial.  Id. 
  When a police officer has stopped a person on the 
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roadside, the driver’s liberty is restrained.  Even though the driver 
is not formally under arrest, he is not free to go.  Thus, a special 
relationship may exist between the officer and the driver and even 
between the officer and the passengers in the vehicle.188
Courts have found hospitals and institutions to have custody of 
mentally ill or handicapped patients.
 
189  When patients are 
involuntarily committed, a custodial relationship may exist 
subjecting the hospital or institution to liability for failure to 
protect.190
In addition, schools often have custody over students.  Courts 
have viewed a school or school district as standing in loco parentis, in 
the place of the parents, while children are at school.
 
191  By 
mandating school attendance, a “state usurps a parent’s protective 
custody of his or her child, replacing it with that of school teachers 
and administrators.”192  Historically, the relationship between 
universities and their students was considered in loco parentis as well 
because students were viewed as minors.193
 
 188. Id.  However, no custody was found where a police officer stopped a 
woman on suspicion of drunk driving but did not arrest her.  Nelson v. Driscoll, 
983 P.2d 972, 981 (Mont. 1999).  Rather, the officer suggested she walk home or 
get a ride, and she was killed by another driver as she walked home.  Id. at 975–76.  
The court stated that custody “contemplate[s] a degree of control akin to 
possession, or a degree of control which results in a physical or legal restraint on 
one's liberty,” and it found that depriving Nelson of her ability to drive home did 
not place her in the officer’s custody. Id. at 981. 
 189. See DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr. Inc., 695 P.2d 255, 260 
(Ariz. 1985) (noting that institution caring for “mental hold” patient had custody 
of patient for purposes of section 314A); Hofflander v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 
664 N.W.2d 545, 572 (Wis. 2003) (holding that custody existed where a hospital 
assumed “enhanced responsibility to protect a vulnerable, mentally disabled 
person” as the hospital had more control over patient in psychiatric ward than 
other patients). 
 190. See In re T.W., 126 P.3d 491, 500 (Mont. 2005) (Leaphart, J., dissenting) 
(noting that woman with mental disabilities who was involuntarily committed to 
the Montana Developmental Center was indisputably within the custody of the 
center). 
 191. E.g. Doe Parents No. 1 v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 591 (Haw. 
2002). 
 192. Id.  See also McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362 
(Wash. 1953) (stating that relationship between school and child is not voluntary 
and the “protective custody of teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the 
parent”). 
 193. See Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 774 (Kan. 1993); see also 
Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 911 (Utah 2005) (noting “. . . the 
fundamental reality that despite the relative developmental maturity of a college 
student compared to, say, a pre-schooler, a college student will inevitably 
relinquish a measure of behavioral autonomy to an instructor . . . .”). 
  Today, however, 
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university students are generally viewed as adults and therefore not 
in the custody of universities.194
In two cases, the court found custody of minors in summer 
school programs which were voluntary, not statutorily mandated.  
In Graham v. Montana State University, a high school student 
attended a camp at a university and was injured in a motorcycle 
accident there.
 
Outside of these commonly accepted custodial relationships, 
state high courts have found the possibility of custody in a few 
outlying situations.  Though none appear to have expanded 
custody quite to the level that Bjerke did, these decisions approach 
the Bjerke definition. 
195  The court concluded that, although the 
university did not have custody of its adult students, taking in a 
minor created a custodial relationship analogous to that of any 
school and its minor students.196  Additionally, in Brown v. Knight, a 
four-year-old child was injured when she fell into a fire pit while 
playing at a park during a summer school program.197  The 
Massachusetts court held that the child was in the custody of the 
proprietress of the program.198  Both courts concluded that custody 
existed where the defendants had taken charge of minors.  Brown 
emphasized that payment was relevant.199 Graham emphasized the 
similarity between the summer program and a high school 
setting.200
In Erickson v. Lavielle, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
confronted the issue of whether two adults who joined a group of 
children for a pontoon ride on the lake for a few hours assumed a 
section 314A(4) duty toward the children.
  In contrast to the majority of cases recognizing custody 
of students by a school, neither court required that the children be 
compelled to participate in those programs. 
201
 
 194. See Nero, 861 P.2d at 774.  However, special relationships can still be 
formed between universities and students in some situations.  See Webb, 125 P.3d at 
911. 
 195. Graham v. Mont. State Univ., 767 P.2d 301 (Mont. 1988). 
 196. Id. at 303–-04.  Though the court found custody, and therefore a duty, the 
plaintiff failed to show proximate cause.  Id. at 304. 
 197. Brown v. Knight, 285 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Mass. 1972). 
 198. Id. at 792 (“[I]n taking for pay custody of Susan, a child unable to care for 
herself, in place of her parents or regular guardians, the defendant had an 
onerous duty to protect Susan from foreseeable harm, including a duty to take 
affirmative protective acts . . . .”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Graham, 767 P.2d at 303–04. 
 201. Erickson v. Lavielle, 368 N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 1985). 
  The court determined 
26
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that it was a question for the jury and reversed summary 
judgment,202
In light of the scarcity of decisions with a similar definition of 
custody,
 holding the door open for a factual finding of custody 
in this situation. 
203 the Bjerke court appears to be breaking new ground.  Yet 
as we have seen, it is not completely alone in extending custody 
beyond its well-accepted applications, especially where minors are 
concerned.204
2. Deprivation of Normal Opportunities for Protection 
 
Once custody is established under section 314A(4), a court 
determines whether custody was taken “under circumstances such 
as to deprive [a person] of his normal opportunities for 
protection.”205  In many decisions, the second element is simply 
implied, but in other cases, like Bjerke, the court offers a substantial 
explanation for the second element.  The common applications of 
the second element closely align with applications of the first 
element.  Specifically, prisoners and school children are often 
found to be deprived of the opportunity to protect themselves.206
The Bjerke court held that Bjerke was deprived of her normal 
 
 
 202. Id. at 627. 
 203. It is useful to note cases where courts held that there was no custody.  See, 
e.g., Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 2000) 
(finding national chapter of a fraternity had no custodial relationship with an 
adult member who died due to excessive alcohol consumption); D.W. v. Bliss, 112 
P.3d 232 (Kan. 2005) (where husband was mentoring and having illegal sexual 
relationship with a minor, inviting minor to the home and to other locations for 
sexual activity, the wife had no custody or control over minor who did not live in 
the home with husband and wife); Dupont v. Aavid Thermal Techs., Inc., 798 A.2d 
587 (N.H. 2002) (holding that minor employee was not in custody of employer 
because employment is voluntary, employer was not parental proxy, and 
employment relationship not analogous to school/student relationship); In re 
Rockweit v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1995) (holding that a family friend who 
visited the family’s campsite and did not extinguish the campfire upon leaving did 
not have any custody over child who fell into the firepit). 
 204. Some appellate courts have utilized a more expansive concept of custody.  
A Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A illustration is based in part on a New 
Jersey case where the court found that a grandmother who was babysitting her 
grandchild had custody of the child, and therefore she was potentially liable for 
the child’s injuries that occurred during her watch. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314A illus. 7 (1965) (citing Barbarisi v. Caruso, 135 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1957)). 
 205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965). 
 206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. b (1965) (noting lack of 
ability to defend along with loss of protection from someone who would be likely 
to offer protection occurs in both the prison and school settings). 
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opportunities for self-protection because she was living away from 
her parents and was dependent on Johnson.207
It is well settled that an inmate confined in a prison has lost 
the ability to protect herself from at least some external factors.
  This conclusion 
represents a new and broader application of the second element of 
section 314A(4).  The decision essentially removes the common 
requirement that the deprivation of protection be involuntary. 
208  
The prisoner is unable to avoid certain dangerous places or 
situations209 and has lost the potential protection of those who 
might otherwise provide it.210  In Joseph v. State, the court reasoned 
that the “imprisonment has diminished the prisoners’ ability to 
care for themselves or has limited the ability of others to help 
prisoners avoid harm, including self-inflicted harm.”211
Schools also remove children from their parents’ protection, 
imposing on the school a duty toward the children.
  Thus, the 
prison setting involuntarily removes the prisoner’s ability to defend 
herself and removes anyone else’s ability to protect the prisoner. 
212  However, 
“[t]he basic premise for this duty is that a child is compelled to 
attend school so that the ‘protective custody of teachers is 
mandatorily substituted for that of the parent.’”213
 
 207. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Minn. 2007). 
 208. Haworth v. State, 592 P.2d 820, 824–25 (Haw. 1979). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 467 (Alaska 2001). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. b (1965) (“[A] child while 
in school is deprived of the protection of his parents or guardian.  Therefore, the 
actor who takes custody . . . of [that] child is properly required to give him the 
protection which the custody or the manner in which it is taken has deprived 
him.”). 
 213. Williams v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Ky. 2003) (quoting 
Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 529 (Ky. 2001)).  See also Doe Parents No. 1 v. 
State, Dep’t of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 591 (Haw. 2002) (stating that due to statute 
requiring school attendance, children were deprived “of the protection from 
reasonably foreseeable harm that their parents normally provide”); Marquay v. 
Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (noting that a major factor in the special 
relationship between a school and student is that school attendance is required); 
McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362 (Wash. 1953) 
(“[T]he relationship here in question is that of school district and school child.  It 
is not a voluntary relationship.  The child is compelled to attend school.  He must 
yield obedience to school rules and discipline formulated and enforced pursuant 
to statute.  The result is that the protective custody of teachers is mandatorily 
substituted for that of the parent.”) (citation omitted). 
  The deprivation 
of normal opportunities for self-protection does not exist merely 
because the children are in the care of the school.  By mandating 
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school attendance, the state essentially removes parents’ ability to 
protect their children. 
In both prisons and schools, those in custody are deprived of 
opportunities for protection in part because others who might 
protect them are prevented from doing so.  Neither the child nor 
the inmate is voluntarily in custody, and those that would normally 
protect the child or inmate have not voluntarily relinquished their 
ability to protect.  That is not the case in Bjerke.  Bjerke herself 
voluntarily went to live with Johnson, and Bjerke’s parents 
voluntarily relinquished their ability to protect their daughter by 
not living in the same home.  Though the Bjerke decision is 
certainly a reasonable interpretation of section 314A(4), it 
significantly expands the definition of “deprivation of 
opportunities for self-protection.”  Under Bjerke, the word 
“deprivation” no longer connotes an involuntary loss of rights; 
rather it merely means a “lack” of opportunity for self-protection.214
However, when courts decrease the importance of 
involuntariness in the custody element, a corresponding decrease 
in involuntariness in the deprivation-of-protection element seems 
to be the trend.  As noted earlier in Graham, the court broadened 
the custody element to the voluntary summer program for high 
school students at a college,
 
215 consequently broadening the 
deprivation-of-protection element as well.  In Brown, when the child 
was in a summer school program at the park, the court similarly 
broadened the deprivation-of-protection element.216
C.   Bjerke Decision Grounded in Prior Minnesota Decisions 
  The Bjerke 
case seems to reflect the same trend.  When the definition of 
custody is broadened, deprivation of opportunities for self-
protection follows. 
Over the last few decades, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
rarely found special relationships giving rise to a duty to protect—
under section 314A(4) or otherwise.217  Yet, as the court explained 
in each case why a special relationship did not exist, it provided 
criteria that would signal a special relationship.218
 
 214. In fact, the Bjerke court used the term “lack” in place of “deprivation” in 
three instances. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 666–67 (Minn. 2007). 
  Thus, while the 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 195–96, 200. 
 216. Brown v. Knight, 285 N.E.2d 790, 791--92 (Mass. 1972). 
 217. See cases cited infra notes 219, 226.  But see case cited infra note 223. 
 218. See cases cited infra notes 219, 223, 226. 
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Bjerke decision represents a significant expansion of nonfeasance 
liability under section 314A(4) in Minnesota, it is not inconsistent 
with the reasoning of cases leading up to Bjerke. 
To briefly review, the court had set out multiple criteria 
signaling a section 314A special relationship.  Custody or control219 
over welfare or “daily welfare,”220 along with deprivation of “normal 
opportunities for protection”221 or “normal powers of self-
protection,” are required for a section 314A(4) relationship.  
Factors signaling deprivation of normal opportunities for 
protection include particular vulnerability, dependence, and 
considerable power held by the actor over another.222  Entrustment 
is important to special relationships generally.223  When 
entrustment exists, acceptance of entrustment is required.224  
Additionally, whether an actor is in a position to assist and should 
be expected to assist is important.225  Finally, the court has 
recognized that duty is ultimately a question of policy,226 and 
sometimes special or unique circumstances create a duty.227
1. Custody or Control over Daily Welfare 
 
Until Bjerke, the Minnesota Supreme Court was not presented 
with facts that were persuasive on the custody issue.228
As a minor, Bjerke resided with Johnson in her home for a 
substantial amount of time.
  Several 
significant facts make Bjerke persuasive when prior cases were not. 
229
 
 219. The term “custody” comes from section 314A(4) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  The term “control” was added through case law.  See Becker v. 
Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 212 (Minn. 2007); Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 
N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1999); H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 
708–09 (Minn. 1996); Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 
539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995). 
 220. See Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213; H.B., 552 N.W.2d at 709. 
 221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965). 
  Though not explicitly stated, the 
court may have distinguished between guests and live-in residents 
 222. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213; Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792; Harper v. 
Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n.2 (Minn. 1993) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 
15, § 56, at 374). 
 223. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989). 
 224. See H.B., 552 N.W.2d at 708; Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168. 
 225. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168. 
 226. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2001); 
Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169. 
 227. See Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169. 
 228. See cases cited supra note 219. 
 229. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W. 2d 660, 663 (Minn. 2007). 
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based on length of stay.230  In comparison, the plaintiff in Harper 
was an adult guest on a boat for one afternoon.231  In Gilbertson, the 
plaintiff was an adult house-guest who stayed overnight.232  In H.B., 
the minor plaintiffs never resided with the defendant, nor did the 
injury occur on the defendant’s property.233  In Donaldson, the 
plaintiff was an adult making a temporary residence at a YWCA.234 
In Becker, the infant patient briefly stayed in the hospital to receive 
treatment for a particular problem; the hospital did not accept 
custody or take control over daily welfare.235  Johnson, in contrast, 
provided room and board, established rules, required chores, and 
had authorization to seek medical treatment for Bjerke.236  Because 
prior case law allowed “control over daily welfare” to substitute for 
custody,237
In short, because Bjerke resided for a substantial period of 
time under Johnson’s care, the living arrangement more closely 
resembled custody.  The dissent did not even dispute the custody 
issue; rather, it argued that the custody did not deprive Bjerke of 
normal opportunities for self-protection.
 the facts in Bjerke support the court’s decision. 
238
2. Deprivation of Normal Opportunities for Self-Protection 
  Although this decision 
significantly expanded the concept of custody, the court’s 
definition of custody had been developing over time, and Bjerke 
provided a significantly clearer showing of custody than prior cases. 
Under prior case law, deprivation of normal opportunities for 
self-protection included additional factors: particular vulnerability, 
dependence, and the defendant’s considerable power over the 
plaintiff.239
 
 230. The court did not find custody when Bjerke stayed with Johnson for short 
time periods, weekends, and even two-and-one-half-week periods; custody began 
when Bjerke resided with Johnson for a full summer.  Id. at 665. 
 231. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 473 (Minn. 1993). 
 232. Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1999). 
 233. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1996). 
 234. Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 
792 (Minn. 1995). 
 235. Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 213 (Minn. 2007).  In Becker the 
court considered it critical that the injuries to the infant took place outside the 
hospital.  Id. 
 236. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 663–64 (Minn. 2007). 
  The Bjerke case incorporates these elements—some 
 237. See cases cited supra note 220. 
 238. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 676 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). 
 239. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213; Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792; Harper v. 
Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n.2 (Minn. 1993) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 
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indirectly—in its analysis.  At first glance, Bjerke appears somewhat 
inconsistent with prior cases applying this factor; however, it follows 
the formula of section 314A adopted in prior cases, making the 
deprivation of protection element secondary to the custody 
element. 
In describing deprivation of opportunities for protection, the 
court applied the elements laid out in prior case law.  The court 
directly addressed dependence, stating that “[t]he natural 
dependence which Bjerke would have had upon Johnson increased 
as her stays at the farm became progressively longer.”240  The court 
also indirectly addressed whether Johnson had considerable power 
over Bjerke, linking that factor to the level of control Johnson had 
over Bjerke’s daily welfare.241  The court did not directly address 
particular vulnerability, but it pointed out a “special 
consideration[]” that Bjerke lived in the same household as 
Bohlman when the abuse occurred, which could create extra 
pressure not to report.242
In addition, although the court’s decision on deprivation of 
normal opportunities for self-protection appears at odds with prior 
cases on point, it is consistent with the formula set out in section 
314A. In H.B. the court stated that small children could protect 
themselves because they could tell their parents about sexual 
abuse.
 
243  In Becker the court stated that the infant was not deprived 
of the opportunity for self-protection because she had none to 
begin with.244  But in Bjerke, the court stated that a high school 
student who voluntarily lived away from her parents did not have 
normal opportunities for self-protection because her parents were 
not there to observe her behaviors.245  The outcomes are arguably 
inconsistent based on the age and vulnerabilities of the plaintiffs.246
Despite the differing outcomes, the Bjerke decision was 
consistent with the language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 314A(4) that appeared in prior cases.  The lack of a self-
 
 
15, § 56 at 374). 
 240. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666. 
 241. Id. at 665. 
 242. Id. at 667. 
 243. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1996). 
 244. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213. 
 245. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666. 
 246. The dissent points out this discrepancy, stating that if the children in H.B. 
were capable of self-protection, then Bjerke certainly was.  Id. at 676 (Anderson, G. 
Barry, J., dissenting). 
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protection element is subordinate to the custody element, and it 
need only be discussed where custody is found.247  Custody itself 
must create the circumstances which deprive a person of 
opportunities for self-protection in order to form a special 
relationship.  Custody did not deprive the children in H.B. of 
anything, nor did custody deprive the infant in Becker of any 
protection.  The custody arrangement did place Bjerke away from 
her parents’ daily observation.248
3. Entrustment and Acceptance 
  Whether the distance between 
parent and child sufficiently deprived Bjerke of the protection 
necessary to satisfy the requirement was a matter of dispute 
between the majority and the dissent.  However, the Bjerke holding 
clearly applied the two elements of section 314A(4) in their proper 
order, the second dependent on the first, and therefore the 
decision is not inconsistent with H.B. or Becker where no custody 
was found. 
The Bjerke decision also followed Erickson, pointing out that 
Bjerke’s parents entrusted Johnson with custody and that Johnson 
accepted that entrustment when she took Bjerke into her home.249  
But like the Erickson decision, the court did not elaborate on 
entrustment.  It also declined to comment on whether Johnson was 
in a position to assist Bjerke or whether she should have been 
expected to, a rule that came out of the Erickson decision.250
4. Public Policy 
 
Noticeably absent in the Bjerke decision on whether a special 
relationship existed was a discussion of public policy.251  Policy was a 
major consideration in several prior cases where the courts asked 
whether a defendant should be required to protect the plaintiff 
from criminal acts.  Because crime prevention is primarily a 
government function,252
 
 247. Id. at 667 n.3 (majority opinion) (noting that when no custodial 
relationship exists any analysis of duty is dicta). 
 248. Id. at 666. 
 249. Id. at 665. 
 250. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989). 
 251. The court does address public policy later in the decision where it holds 
that primary assumption of the risk is not a defense for Johnson.  See Bjerke, 742 
N.W.2d at 670. 
 transferring it to a private party is a 
 252. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 n.4 (Minn. 2001); 
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significant policy consideration.  However, the Bjerke situation is 
distinguishable from the prior cases because the criminal was not a 
stranger, and, therefore, creating a duty to protect was justifiable 
on policy grounds. 
In Pietila the court rhetorically asked, “[H]ow can one know 
what measures will protect against the thug, the narcotic addict, the 
degenerate, the psychopath, and the psychotic?  Must the owner 
prevent all crime?”253  In Funchess, the court noted that “criminals 
are unpredictable and bent on defeating security measures.”254  In 
both cases, the court held there was no duty to protect against 
criminals.255  However, in Erickson the court took note of the 
inherent problem of a “duty to contain a slippery criminal” but 
held instead that the parking ramp presented such a “unique 
opportunity” for criminal activity that it justified a duty.256
D. Unanswered Questions: The Presence or Absence of Parents 
 
The Bjerke case is distinguishable in that a stranger did not 
commit the criminal acts.  A member of the household, a person in 
an intimate relationship with both Johnson and Bjerke, committed 
the acts.  While it may be impossible to predict a criminal break-in, 
it is possible to see signs of an inappropriate relationship occurring 
in one’s home and predict the harm that will come of it.  Thus, the 
policy argument applied in prior cases against a duty to protect 
from unknown criminals is obviated when confronted with the 
situation in Bjerke. 
The duty to protect based on a special relationship is 
fundamentally grounded in the nature of the relationship itself.  
When the relationship is between a child and a custodian, the 
custodian’s relationship with the parents may be irrelevant unless it 
enters through other means, as it did in Bjerke.257
 
Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169. 
 253. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1985). 
 254. Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 673 n.4 (denying a special relationship duty to 
protect between landlord and tenant). 
 255. Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 675; Pietila, 362 N.W.2d at 333. 
 256. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.  The dissent in H.B. would follow the Erickson 
lead and recognize special circumstances justifying a duty to protect in light of the 
public policy of protecting children against child abuse.  H.B. ex rel. Clark v. 
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1996) (Gardenbring, J., dissenting). 
  The court found 
 257. For example, under a common carrier/passenger special relationship 
where a child is a passenger on a train, the relationship between the parent and 
the child or between the parent and the railroad company is irrelevant; the child is 
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that a child’s “primary source of protection” is her parents,258 and, 
when parent and child live together, the parent “is more able” to 
observe behavior that would indicate abuse.259  The court 
concluded that, because Bjerke and her parents lived apart, her 
parents could not effectively make such observations, and thus 
Bjerke was deprived of normal opportunities for self-protection.260
Two alternative interpretations arise from Bjerke, each 
generating its own subsequent problem.  First, the court made no 
real inquiry into the level of oversight Bjerke’s parents had while 
living apart from her, which may indicate that the court believes 
that any absence from parents is a deprivation of opportunities for 
self-protection.  This would greatly expand liability for nonfeasance 
in a custodial relationship.  Second, if the court were to analyze the 
factual situation to determine whether the parents had sufficient 
oversight while living apart, then the presence or absence of the 
parents’ oversight, a factor outside the control of the custodian, 
could affect the custodian’s liability.
  
The Bjerke decision raises questions which will need to be addressed 
as the courts apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A to 
caretaker/child relationships.  The answers to these questions will 
determine the extent of the expansion in nonfeasance liability 
created by the Bjerke decision. 
261
The Bjerke case is a good example of a situation where one 
could reasonably conclude that a child’s parents could not have 
protected her even if she had lived in their home.  First, Bjerke 
never lacked the ability or the opportunity to tell anyone, including 
her parents, about her relationship.
 
Considering the first issue, if the court believes that any child 
living apart from parents is deprived of normal opportunities for 
self-protection, then liability could be greatly expanded.  Courts 
may even charge a custodian with a duty to protect against harm 
that the parents may not have been able to prevent. 
262
 
in a special relationship with the railroad company because of his or her status as 
passenger.  See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 674 (Minn. 2007) (Hanson, J., 
concurring). 
 258. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (creating a duty to 
protect based on the relationship between one who “undertakes . . . to render 
services to another . . . necessary for the protection of a third person . . .” and the 
receiver of those services). 
 262. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666. 
  She talked to her parents 
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regularly on the telephone and frequently contacted them while 
living with Johnson.263  She intentionally kept the relationship a 
secret because she wanted it to continue.264  In addition, Bjerke was 
not forced to go to or remain at the farm,265 nor was she forced to 
enter into the relationship with Bohlman.266
If a court concludes that living away from parents 
automatically equals deprivation of opportunities for self-
protection, then a custodian may be liable for what the parents 
could not have prevented.  If the parents could not prevent the 
harm, then arguably no actual deprivation of opportunity for self-
protection would occur.  Hence, negligence liability would turn on 
deprivation in theory rather than actual deprivation.
  Finally, no cited 
evidence indicated that Bjerke’s parents would have observed any 
behavioral changes in her if she had lived with them. 
267
Considering the second issue, if liability depends on the level 
of the parents’ actual oversight of their child while living apart, 
then the custodian’s liability could depend on the parents’ 
relationship to the child, which runs contrary to the rule that the 
special relationship itself creates liability.  For example, when 
parents are heavily involved in their child’s daily life by monitoring 
and observing her behavior via frequent visits, telephone calls, and 
e-mail, the likelihood that they will observe a change in behavior 
increases.  Even if they do not observe a behavior change, the 
opportunity to do so exists.  The child’s normal opportunities for 
self-protection, that is, her parents’ oversight, are not lost.  It would 
follow then, that a parent who abdicates all oversight over the child 
creates a duty to protect in the custodian, while a parent who 
maintains a great deal of oversight relieves the custodian of a duty 
to protect.  A caretaker’s liability could then turn on the level of 
oversight that the child’s parents choose to exercise.  This would 
 
 
 263. Brief and Appendix of Appellant at 7, Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660 
(Minn. 2007) (No. A06-0117). 
 264. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 664. 
 265. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666–69.  By her junior year, Bjerke had her driver’s 
license and drove herself back and forth between Island Farm and school.  See 
Brief and Appendix of Appellant at 5, Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 
2007) (No. A06-0117).  She subsequently enrolled in post-secondary education at a 
local college for her senior year of high school and thus had substantial 
independence. Id. 
 266. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 664. 
 267. Compare to Becker, where the court held that the infant patient at the 
Mayo clinic was not actually deprived of opportunities for protection because she 
had none.  Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 213 (Minn. 2007). 
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produce a result unfair to the custodian, and it would conflict with 
the special–relationship rule.  The relationship must be between 
the actor and the person in need of protection—here, the 
custodian and the child. 
Ultimately, the court’s emphasis on the idea that parental 
oversight constitutes “normal opportunities for self-protection” 
poses questions that future applications of the Bjerke decision must 
address.  The direction the court takes with these questions will 
determine the true extent of the case’s expansion of nonfeasance 
liability in Minnesota, especially with regard to the protection of 
children. 
E. Trend Toward Broader Liability for Nonfeasance and the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts 
Through the introduction of special relationships, the 
exceptions to the no-duty-to-protect rule have been increasing, and 
commentators have long noticed a trend toward the expansion of 
liability.268  The Restatement (Second) of Torts expanded the Restatement 
(First) of Torts’ section on affirmative duty, listed specific special 
relationships for the first time, and noted that the law appeared to 
be “working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or 
protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”269
The third installment of the Restatement (Third) of Torts is titled 
“Liability for Physical Harm”
  
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes even more special 
relationships and predicts new ones appearing on the horizon. 
270 and has substantially narrowed its 
scope to negligence and related issues.271
 
 268. See, e.g., John M. Adler, Relying upon the Unreasonableness of Strangers: Some 
Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect 
Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 896–97 (noting the expansion of nonfeasance 
liability in Michigan and New Jersey). 
 269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965). 
 270. The first two installments, Products Liability and Apportionment of 
Liability, were completed in 1998 and 2000 respectively.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM Introduction xli (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2005). 
 271. This installment does not cover products liability, intentional torts or 
liability for non-physical harm such as invasion of privacy or damage to reputation, 
all of which are either addressed in prior installments or still governed by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM Introduction xlii (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
  The structure differs 
significantly from the first two Restatements in both numbering and 
organization.  In its current form, the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
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provides even more support for the Bjerke decision than did the 
Restatement (Second). 
First, one should note its organization.  Chapter seven of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts covers affirmative duties.  It begins by 
rephrasing the no-duty rule and introducing the exceptions.  
Section 37 states that “[a]n actor whose conduct has not created a 
risk of physical harm to another has no duty of care to the other 
unless a court determines that one of the affirmative duties 
provided in §§ 38–44 is applicable.”272
Of particular relevance to the Bjerke discussion is section 40, 
titled “Duty Based on Special Relationship with Another.”  Section 
40 recognizes more special relationships than did the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and it changes the language of the section 314A(4) 
custodial relationship
  Next, the chapter lays out 
the seven areas of affirmative duty, the exceptions to the no-duty 
rule. 
273
b) the custodian has a superior ability to protect the 
other.
 applied in Bjerke.  Section 40, part 7 reads: 
(a) [A]n actor in a special relationship with another owes 
the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks 
that arise within the scope of the relationship. 
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided 
in Subsection (a) include: 
... 
(7) a custodian with those in its custody, if: 
a) the custodian is required by law to take custody or 
voluntarily takes custody of the other; and 
274
By replacing the “deprivation of opportunities for protection” 
language and requiring only that the custodian has “superior ability 
to protect,” the Restatement (Third) of Torts appears to expand the 
breadth of the custodial special relationship.  Whether Johnson 
had a superior ability to protect Bjerke may be particularly 
 
 
 272. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 37 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, supra, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 
(1965) (“[T]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part 
is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a 
duty to take such action.”). 
 273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 
cmt. n (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 274. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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applicable in light of the injury.  Where there is sexual abuse in the 
home, the court noted, the child is pressured not to report.275
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes a broader 
school/student special relationship, which was missing in the 
Restatement (Second), and it bases the duty on custody and 
replacement of the child’s parental protection.
  
Under the psychological pressure of sexual abuse and because of a 
minor’s inability to understand the long-term harm, a court might 
find that Johnson had a superior ability to report. 
In addition, the comments and reporters’ notes to section 40 
provide support for the Bjerke decision in that they loosen the 
definition of custody to extend to more clearly voluntary 
relationships than is currently the case.  They also recognize 
broader and more numerous special relationships than did the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
276  It notes that the 
school/student relationship includes students attending athletic 
competitions and notes the disparity between courts on special 
relationships between colleges and students, which have not 
entirely gone away.277
The comments and reporters’ notes provide examples of 
additional special relationships, such as between a daycare and its 
clients’ children, between camps and their campers,
 
278 and between 
a school bus driver and the bus’s riders.279
Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of Torts notes that the 
special relationships listed are not exclusive.
  This reflects a trend 
toward broader definitions of custody and deprivation of 
protection which will expand the special-relationship exception to 
the no-duty rule. 
280  The reporters 
predict that a likely addition to the special relationship list is the 
relationship between family members, especially when they are 
living together.281  The Restatement (Third)’s comments also note that 
parents have a custodial duty toward their children,282
 
 275. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007). 
 276. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 cmt. 1 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. § 40 cmt. n. 
 279. Id. § 40 cmt. i (noting overlap between custodial relationships and those 
between common carriers and passengers). 
 280. Id. at cmt. O. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 though thus 
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far the parent/child relationship has not been added to the list of 
special relationships laid out in section 40.  Again, the indication is 
that the Restatement (Third) of Torts is recognizing an expansion of 
liability based on special relationships. 
While it remains to be seen how and when the new Restatement 
(Third) of Torts special–relationship rule will be applied to a 
custodial relationship, it represents a trend toward greater liability.  
Based on the Bjerke decision, Minnesota may be at the forefront of 
this trend. 
V. CONCLUSION 
American courts have historically been reluctant to create a 
duty in one person to protect another, so the Bjerke decision 
reflects a significant expansion of nonfeasance liability both in 
Minnesota and across the country.  However, the decision clearly 
employs the special–relationship factors laid out in decisions 
leading up to Bjerke and thus is consistent with prior Minnesota 
common law. 
The Bjerke decision does leave us with questions about how it 
will be applied in the future.  Does the court believe that any 
separation between child and parents is a deprivation of 
opportunity for self-protection?  Alternatively, does the level of 
parental oversight determine whether an opportunity for self-
protection is lost?  Future courts may be asked to answer these 
questions, and their answers will determine the scope of the Bjerke 
decision. 
Ultimately, the Bjerke decision represents what the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts and commentators predict is a trend toward greater 
nonfeasance liability through the exception of special 
relationships.  Bjerke nudged open the door to greater nonfeasance 
liability in Minnesota.  It broadened the definition of custody and 
the concept of deprivation of opportunities for self-protection.  
Now the courts must decide just how far that door has been 
opened. 
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